CIVIL RIGHTS: PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
EXISTS
UNDER
TITLE VII
NOTWITH-

STANDING
EEOC DETERMINATION
NO REASONABLE CAUSE

OF

In Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp.' the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that a finding of "no reasonable cause" by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) did not bar district
court jurisdiction of the complainant's suit against his employer
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Fekete was employed
by U.S. Steel from 1964 until 1967, and upon his dismissal he filed a
complaint with the EEOC pursuant to Title VII, alleging that his
discharge had been based upon his Hungarian origin. Initially, the
complaint was referred to the appropriate state fair employment
practices agency as required by Title VII. 3 After the state agency
rejected the charge of discrimination, the EEOC conducted its own
investigation and concluded that no reasonable cause existed to
believe that the employer had violated the Act. Soon thereafter,
Fekete commenced an action in the appropriate federal district court,
reasserting his charge of discrimination based upon national origin.
The court dismissed the action, holding under certain provisions of
the Act 4 that the EEOC's finding of no reasonable cause precluded the
court from taking jurisdiction of the matter. The court of appeals
unanimously reversed, holding that an aggrieved party may initiate
such an action under Title VII notwithstanding an EEOC finding of
no reasonable cause.
1. 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964).
3. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
4. The following language is that relied upon by the court:
Whenever it is charged in writing under oath by a person claiming to be aggrieved...
that an employer. . . has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Commission
. . . shall make an investigation of such charge. . .. If the Commission shall determine,
after such investigation, that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true,
the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.
If'. . . the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this
subchapter, the Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved and a civil action may,
within thirty days thereafter, be brought against the respondent named in the charge (1)
by the person claiming to be aggrieved. . . . Id. § 2000e-5 (a) & (e).
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes unlawful
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. 5 The administrative agency created to handle
complaints of discrimination under the title is the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.' Although the Commission is empowered
to investigate charges of employment discrimination, its function in
the actual resolution of grievances is limited to "informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 7 Enforcement power is left
entirely to the federal courts, which may enjoin future violations of the
Act and "order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate ..

."8 When a charge is properly before the

Commission, 9 the Commission is required to conduct an investigation
and upon determining "that there is reasonable cause to believe that
the charge is true, . . . eliminate any such unlawful employment
practice. . . ."10 If within the prescribed time "the Commission has
[the Act], the
been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with .
Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved . , " and the

complainant may then commence a civil action against the charged
party.
In the course of the Civil Rights Act's troubled journey through
Congress, perhaps the most substantial single political compromise
made to ensure its passage was the Senate amendment of Title VII
which stripped the Commission of its proposed enforcement power."2
As an amendment to Title VII of the Kennedy Administration's
proposed Civil Rights Act of 196313 Congressman Roosevelt offered
5. Id. § 2000e-2.

6. Id. § 2000e-4(a).
7. Id. § 2000e-5(a).
8. Id. § 2OOe-5(g).

9. In addition to the aggrieved party, a Commission member may also initiate action by
filing a charge "where he has reasonable cause to believe a violation of this subchapter has

... Id. § 2000e-5(a). If the alleged discrimination occurred in a state which has
occurred.
fair employment practice legislation covering the act in question, the aggrieved party must
utilize whatever state administrative remedies are available before filing a charge with the

Commission. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
10. Id. § 2000e-5(a).
11. Id. § 2000e-5(e).
12. The Senate compromise, popularly known as the Dirksen, or Mansfield-Dirksen
Amendment, removed from the EEOC the power to file suits on its own. See notes 28-31 infra
and accompanying text. See generally Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & CONI.
L. REV. 431, 445-57 (1966); Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. Ci. L. REV. 432-34 (1965).
13. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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H.R. 405,14 the "nominal ancestor"' 15 of the present Title VI I. Section
10 of that bill provided that, should informal methods of conciliation
fail to resolve a complaint, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Board would be empowered to conduct an adversary hearing. If the
Board determined that the respondent had engaged in an unlawful
employment practice, it could issue a cease and desist order " and, if
necessary to obtain compliance, petition a court of appeals for
enforcement of its order. 17 A person aggrieved by a final order of the
Board could obtain judicial review thereof, 8 but the individual could
not bring an action on his own behalf. When reported out by the
House Education and Labor Committee, H.R. 405 went to the Rules
Committee where it lay dormant while the House Judiciary
Committee considered the Administration's omnibus civil rights bill,
H.R. 7152,11 which did not itself declare any employment practices to
be unlawful.2" In the Judiciary Committee, Congressman Roosevelt
offered H.R. 405 as an amendment to Title VII, asserting that the
inclusion of the bill in the proposed omnibus act had the support of
the Administration. 2' Principally because a "substantial number of
committee members . . . preferred that the ultimate determination of
discrimination rest with the Federal judiciary, 2 2 the version of Title
VII finally reported by the Judiciary Committee provided that if
informal conciliation failed, the EEOC should have the power to
bring a de novo civil action against an alleged discriminator rather
than the power to issue cease and desist orders. If the Commission
failed or declined to bring such an action, the aggrieved party could,
14. H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See Hearings on Civil Rights Before Subcomm.
No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 2282-99 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Hearingson Civil Rights].
15. Vaas, supra note 12, at 433.
16. H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1963); H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
10-11 (1963).
17. H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1963); H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., Ist Sess.
11(1963).
18. H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11(h) (1963).
19. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963).
20. Although Title VII of H.R. 7152 created a Presidential Commission on Equal
Employment Opportunity, the provision served merely to provide a statutory basis for prior
executive action. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Comp.), as amended by
Exec. Order No. 11, 114, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1959-1963 Comp.), created a Presidential Commission
on Equal Employment Opportunity which was intended to prevent employment discrimination
by government contractors and subcontractors in federally assisted programs.
21. Hearingson Civil Rights 2284.
22. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 29 (1963).
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with the written approval of at least one member of the Commission,
bring the action in his own behalf.2 As amended by the Judiciary
Committee, and despite many unsuccessful attempts at floor
amendment, H.R. 405 became Title VII of the bill passed by the
House on February 10, 1964.24
The House bill was read for the first time in the Senate on

February 17, and the hopes of the bill's supporters that the Senate
would give the House measure early consideration and adopt it

verbatim were soon lost in extended debate35 It was not until March
26 that the Senate agreed both to consider the bill" and to table a
motion to refer it to the Judiciary Committee. Debate continued well

into June when Senator Dirksen introduced an amendment in the
nature of a substitute for the entire bill. 2 The proposed new Title VII
represented one of the crucial political compromises necessary to
obtain Senate approval of the entire bill. It stripped the EEOC of its
power to bring suit and placed in the hands of the aggrieved party the

power to bring an independent action against his employer without
the prior approval of any members of the Commission. 9 The Senate

voted cloture on the same day that the Dirksen Amendment was
introduced, 30 the amendment was approved a week later, 31and on June
23. Sections 707(b) & (c), H.R. 7152, reproduced in H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist
Sess., pt. 1,at 12 (1963).
24. 110 CONG. REc. 2804-05 (1964). The House vote was 290 to 130. A last minute motion
by Congressman Cramer to recommit the bill to the Judiciary Committee failed. Id. at 2804.
For a summary of the amendments approved by the House, see Vaas, supra note 12, at 438-40.
25. In his initial remarks on the bill, Minority Leader Dirksen, perhaps giving an indication
of things to come, observed that he had examined "every word, every phrase, every line" of both
the original and amended House bills, and that "[allready, some amendments have occurred to
me ....
If I think they have merit, I shall offer them." Id. at 2885.
26. Id. at 6417.
27. Id. at 6455. The motion to refer the bill to the Judiciary Committee was made by one of
the strongest supporters of the bill, Senator Morse. His reason for so moving was stated in an
elaborate and eloquent fashion-to provide meaningful legislative history:
If I ever saw a bill that needed to be clarified for the courts by way of a committee
report, the argument which has taken place on the floor of the Senate in the past 14 days
has shown that bill to be the one before the Senate.
Those Senators [who have been debating the bill] cannot agree on any part of the bill.
They cannot agree on definitions. They cannot agree on meanings. What can we expect
the courts to do when they come to consider legislation about which Senators are in such
disagreement? Id. at 6419.
28. Amendment No. 1052, 110 CONG. Rac. 13310 (1964). This amendment was offered as
a substitute for Amendment 656. See note 34 infra.
29. Id. §§ 706(a) & (e).
30. 110 CONG. REc. 13327 (1964).
3 I.Id. at 14239.
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19 the Senate passed the entire bill.32 The amended bill went back to
the House, and, after brief hearings, a resolution calling for approval
of the Senate amendments was passedY
Unlike the Civil Rights Act as a whole, it seems clear that the
legislative history of the current enforcement provisions of Title VII
dates only from May 26, 1964, the date on which Senator Dirksen
first introduced the present language in a substitute amendmentY The

only discussion on the Senate floor during the record 83 day debate
which is directly relevant to the question of whether an affirmative

finding of reasonable cause by the EEOC is a condition precedent to
the individual's right to sue occurred during debate on an amendment
submitted by Senator Ervin 35 where the following exchange took

place:
MR. CANNON. Does the distinguished Senator agree that it is a
prerequisite that the Commission find that such condition [reasonable cause]
existed before the individual can sue?
MR. HUMPHREY. I do not agree to that. The point is that the Commission
may offer to advise the Attorney General. The individual may proceed in his
own right at any time. He may take his complaint to the Commission, he may
bypass the Commission, or he may go directly to court.36

37
Although Senator Humphrey almost certainly overstated his case,

his immediate answer to Senator Cannon's question finds support in

the somewhat more precise language of Senator Javits later in the
same debate:
The Commission may find the claim invalid; yet the complainant still can sue,

and so may the Attorney General, if he finds reasonable cause for doing so. In
short, the Commission does not hold the key to the courtroom door. The only
32. Id. at 14511.
33. Id. at 15897. President Johnson signed the amended H.R. 7152 into law immediately
following the vote.
34. See note 28 supra. Commenting on Amendment No. 656, Senator Dirksen said:
As I look back now upon how [sic] upon the time that has been devoted to the bill, I
doubt very much whether in my whole legislative lifetime any measure received such
meticulous attention. We have tried to be mindful of every word, of every comma, and of
the shading of every phrase. 110 CONG. REc. 11935 (1964).
35. Amendment No. 590 would have deleted from section 706(a) of Title VII the power of
an EEOC member to file a charge on behalf of an aggrieved party. See 110 CONG. Rac. 14192
(1964).
36. Id. 14188.
37. See note 42 infra. See also Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 187 n.9 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966).
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thing this title gives the Commission is time in which to find that there has been
a violation and time in which to seek conciliation.
[A finding of reasonable cause]
of taking a defendant to court-3

. . . is

not a condition precedent to the action

Senator Ervin took the opposite view, asserting that "the aggrieved
party cannot sue in the Federal courts unless the Commission first
finds that there is reasonable cause to believe the charge is

true.

.

.

.

"3

The inference from the foregoing discussion is that at

least the supporters and drafters of the compromise Title VII

language felt that a Commission finding of reasonable cause was not
a prerequisite to the individual's right to file suit,40 while at least some
of the opponents of the bill held the contrary view. The history of the

civil rights bill in both houses is, from its inception, replete with
statements regarding the emphasis placed upon voluntary proceedings

and informal conciliation.4 This history seems to buttress the position
that one may not bypass the Commission entirely under a Title VII

cause of action4 2 but is not relevant to an assessment of the reasonable
cause requirement. It is apparent that in spite of the staggering

number of words spoken in Congress in discussion of the civil rights
bill, only fleeting consideration was given to the question of whether a
finding of reasonable cause by the Commission is a procedural
4 3
prerequisite to the individual's right to bring suit.
38. 110 Cong. Rec. 14191 (1964).
39. Id. at 14188.
40. Cf id. at 14191 (remarks of Senator Saltonstall).
"41. See, e.g., id. at 14190 (remarks of Senator Morse); id. at 14443 (remarks of Senator
Humphrey); id. at 12690 (remarks of Senator Saltonstall); id. at 2565 (remarks of Congressman
Lindsay).
42. See Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1969) (dictum); Stebbins v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 910 (1968);
Grimm v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 300 F. Supp. 984, 986 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (dictum); Berg,
Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 62,
83 n.39 (1964); Walker, Title V:11Complaint and Enforcement Procedures and Relief and
Remedies, 7 B.C. IND. &CONt. L. REv. 495, 497 (1966); cf Hearingson H.R. Res. 789 Before
the House Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
H.R. Res. 789], where it is stated that a charge "must be filed" with the EEOC.
43. In the House deliberations on the Senate amendments, Congressmen McCulloch had the
following remarks about the individual's right to sue under the bill:
[l]f
within 30 days after the Commission has completed its investigation it fails to obtain
voluntary compliance, it shall notify the person aggrieved. Thereafter, the person
aggrieved shall have 30 days to file a suit in a Federal court. Hearingson H.R. Res. 789
at 19.
The history of the Title VII compromise language in the senate does not appear to justify Congressman Celler's statement prior to final House passage that "[n]o phrase of the bill has been
left unexplored, undefined, unexplained." 110 CONG. REC. 15894 (1964).
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In the first court case dealing with the enforcement provisions of
Title VII, a federal district court held that a complaint seeking
injunctive relief for employment discrimination could be prosecuted
as a class action." After a Commission finding of reasonable cause,
conciliation failed and the complainant brought suit. When others of
the same class as the plaintiff sought to intervene, the court held that,
with regard to the injunctive relief which would benefit the entire
class, the intervenors need not have personally exhausted their
administrative remedies with the Commission." The requirement of
resort to the Commission "was not designed to serve as a screen to
prevent frivolous complaints from reaching the courts."4 6 In Edwards
v. North American Rockwell Corp.4 7 a plaintiff filed a complaint with
the Commission, but a finding of reasonable cause was never made.
More than 60 days after the original complaint was filed, suit was
initiated. The defendant's motion for dismissal was granted on several
grounds, but the court made a specific finding that it was not deprived
of jurisdiction by the Commission's failure to make a reasonable
cause determination or by its failure affirmatively to seek
conciliation."
Several cases have held that actual efforts by the Commission to
conciliate a grievance do not constitute a jurisdictional prerequisite to
the individual's right to sue so long as the EEOC is given the
opportunity to conciliate before an individual sues.49 In all of these
cases there had been an affirmative finding of reasonable cause by the
Commission. In Miller v. InternationalPaperCo. 0 a suit was allowed
where the Commission had been unable to determine whether or not
In Congressman Celler's summation of the Senate amendments to the bill immediately prior
to the final House vote, he stated only:
The Equal Employment Opportujnity Commission is given a maximum of 60 days in
which to obtain voluntary compliance with the provisions of the law. If they [sic] are not
able to do so, the aggrieved party in any case may file an action in the Federal district
court in which the practice occurred. 110 CONG. Rrc. 15896 (1964).
44. Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
45. Id. at 188. The plaintiff's compliance with Commission procedure was seen as satisfying
the requirement for the entire class.
46. Id. Reliance was placed on Senator Javits' remarks on the floor of the Senate discussed
in the text accompanying note 38 supra.
47. 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
48. Id. at 211.
49. Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line
Ry., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968); Holliday v. Railway Express Co., 306 F. Supp. 898 (N.D. Ga.
1969).
50. 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
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reasonable cause existed. Prior to Fekete, the only case holding that
suit could be maintained in spite of an affirmative finding of no
reasonable cause was Grimm v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.', The
Grimm opinion represents an excellent survey of judicial application
of the enforcement language of Title VII, concluding that "the
jurisdictional hurdles in Title VII pertain only to the filing of charges
with the Commission and the receipt of notice from the Commission
concerning compliance. ' 52 The thrust of the Grimm opinion is that
the courts have properly given liberal treatment to the statutory
language dealing with remedies available to an aggrieved party.53 The
court observed:
The question in each instance is whether a Commission determination adverse
to those whose rights are established by Title VII can be judicially preclusive,
and the answer in each case must be "no."
A contrary resolution of this question would vest the Commission with a
U
final, legally effective authority not contemplated by the statute ....

In Fekete the court of appeals based its decision on two factors:
the legislative history of Title VII presents no firm guidelines with
respect to the issues involved in the case, and "good reason and fealty
to the spirit and purpose of the Act"'55 demand that the enforcement
power given to the individual grievant not be cut off by a preliminary
determination by an agency not possessing such power itself. As for
legislative intent, the court stated that the political compromise which
led to the passage of the Act created a situation in which Congress
never considered the issue presented.56 This, of course, is not strictly
accurate, 57 but it is true that the only apparent consideration given by
Congress to the procedural question in Fekete occurred during a brief
floor debate, and no committee ever considered the question." s The
history of Title VII clearly reflects a congressional unwillingness to
give the EEOC any substantial, conclusive power but, instead, to
51. 300 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
52. Id. at 986.
53. Id. at 987-88.
54. Id. at 990.
55. 424 F.2d at 336.
56. Id. at 334.
57. See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
58. The Supreme Court has stated the rule many times that "debates in Congress are not
appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the language of a
statute.
... United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897). The
courts will, however, give weight to "the [text of the] bill as introduced, [and] changes made in
the frame of the bill in the course of its passage.
... United States v. St. Paul, Minneapolis &
Manitoba Ry., 247 U.S. 310, 318 (1918).
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place principal responsibility for enforcement upon the individual
complainant and the courts. Even before H.R. 7152 reached the
Senate, the House had replaced the Commission's power to issue
cease and desist orders with a power to bring de novo court actions
because many members of the House Judiciary Committee
"preferred that the ultimate determination of discrimination rest with
the Federal judiciary"5 9 rather than with the Commission. The
removal of Commission enforcement power was completed in the
Senate by the Dirksen Amendment 0 when the power to sue was also
taken from the Commission. The view that a Commission
determination of no reasonable cause should preclude any further
judicial proceedings 6 ' does indeed appear inconsistent with the
statutory absence of any Commission power to make a final and
binding determination of any matter.6 2 Since an affirmative finding of
reasonable cause is without binding legal significance, it is difficult to
see why a contrary finding should be treated any differently. 3 A
second factor which should be accorded considerable weight is the
wording of the statute itself. Section 706(a) makes a finding of
reasonable cause a condition precedent only to Commission
conciliation efforts.6 4 In contrast to this language, section 706(e)
provides that the individual may commence judicial proceedings " [i]f
• . . the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance
,,15 Had Congress intended a finding of
with this subchapter ....
59. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 29.
60. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 14188 (1964) (remarks of Senator Ervin). See text accompanying note 39 supra.
62. See Anderson, Civil Rights and Fair Employment, 22 Bus. LAW. 513 (1967). "'The
EEOC itself has no power to make an interpretation of the law which is binding on anyone. It
has no power to make an effective determination that anyone has or has not violated the law."
Id. at 522.
Two additional matters should be noted. First, in addition to the Commission's lack of legally
binding power, "[n]othing said or done during . . . [Commission investigations] may be...
used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
Second, the Fekete court also emphasized the well-established principle reiterated recently in
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, (1970), that -It]here is no
Id. at 157.
presumption against judicial review and in favor of administrative absolutism.
See 424 F.2d at 334.
63. See Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity: Procedure Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 55 ILL. B.J. 654, 655 (1967).
64. "If the Commission shall determine, after such investigation, that there is reasonable
cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
alleged unlawful employment practice.
65. Id. § 2000e-5(e).
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reasonable cause to be a prerequisite to court action by the
complainant, it would have been a simple matter to have so provided
in either of the foregoing sections. The fact that Congress did not so
provide, taken in light of the legislative history of Title VII and the
remarks made on the floor by those privy to the Dirksen Amendment
negotiations,6" leads to the conclusion that the Fekete court's
resolution was well justified.
The Fekete decision certainly presents the possibility of increased
resort to the courts by those complainants who are initially met with a
"no reasonable cause" determination by the Commission. Although
a substantial majority of those complaints not settled
administratively result in a finding of reasonable cause, the number
resulting in a determination adverse to the complainant is in the
hundreds each year, creating a corresponding number of potential
plaintiffs. Several factors, however, indicate that no great upsurge in
litigation under Title VII will occur. In the first place, it would be
unreasonable to assume that every complaint resulting in a no
reasonable cause finding will end up in the courts. Secondly, there
was, from the Act's inception, considerable support for the view
adopted in Fekete19 Arguably, not many complainants have been
deterred from filing suit, notwithstanding a few scattered adverse
decisions by the lower federal courts. A third and less apparent reason
for believing that Fekete will not produce a wave of lawsuits is that
many individuals doubtless rely heavily on Commission investigation
reports in the preparation of a case. 70 If that research led the
Commission to a conclusion of no reasonable cause, the chances are
quite good that the record does not establish a very imposing case for
the would-be plaintiff.
66. See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text.
67. Excluding complaints which have been administratively settled or voluntarily
withdrawn, the rate of findings of "reasonable cause" is approxiately 75 percent. This compares

with a similar rate of 50 percent in state fair employment practice commissions. Comment, Title
V11, Civil Rights Act of 1964: Present Operationand Proposalsfor Improvement, 5 COLuM. J.
1, 22 (1969); cf. J. WITHERSPOON, ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF
CIVIL RIGHTS 14-17 (1968).
68. 5 COLUM. J.OF L. & Soc. PROB., supra note 67, at 22.
69. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 42, at 83 n.39; Gardner, The ProceduralSteps of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 ALA. LAW. 80, 86 (1968); cf Anderson, supra note 62, at 522.
It should be noted that the EEOC itself appeared in Fekete as amicus curiae on behalf of
appellant's position. See 424 F.2d at 333 n.2.
70. 5 COLUM. J. OF L. & Soc. PROB., supra note 67, at 43. The EEOC has made available
OF L. & Soc. PROB.

for the private suit substantially all relevant investigation and certain conciliation records and
has generally attempted to cooperate with the private litigant in whatever way possible.
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Since it is highly unlikely that Fekete will be expanded to the point
of sanctioning a total avoidance of EEOC machinery, 71 the
Commission will continue to play a major role in the settlement of
discrimination disputes. As long as Title VII requires resort to the
EEOC in the first instance, it is to the advantage of both the employee
and employer to try to settle the dispute voluntarily even though the
agency has no enforcement power. Under Fekete, the employer knows
that even if the Commission finds "no reasonable cause," he still
might be sued in the district court. While the Fekete decision does not
undermine the congressional scheme requiring prior resort to the
administrative agency, it does call into question the wisdom of Title
VI I's allocation of functions between court and agency. It would
appear that the EEOC, like other federal agencies, would necessarily
acquire skill and expertise in its specialized field, and that its findings
of fact should be accorded some weight in subsequent court
proceedings. The Fekete decision necessarily means that in instances
where the aggrieved party goes ahead and files suit in the face of a "no
reasonable cause" finding, the Commission's work has been to little
avail. Short of adopting the scheme originally proposed of giving the
Commission the power to issue cease and desist orders and allowing
aggrieved persons to seek judicial review thereof, 72 there seems to be
another way to prevent resort to the Commission from becoming a
mere perfunctory exercise. If the findings of fact of the Commission
were made conclusive in subsequent court proceedings "if supported
by substantial evidence," there would be less duplication of effort by
agency and court. The type of problem with which the EEOC deals is
similar to the discrimination charges which the NLRB routinely
decides.73 In such cases the findings of the Board are conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence, 74 and the reviewing court does not
waste judicial energy finding facts supposedly already found by a
more expert body. Where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent
upon prior resort to an administrative agency, it would seem more
efficacious to give the agency's findings of fact some weight in the
71. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
72. See notes 16 & 18 supra and accompanying text.
73. See National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(3) & (4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) & (4)
(1964), making it an unfair labor practice to discriminate against an employee in order to
discourage membership in a labor organization or because an employee has filed charges or
given testimony against the employer.
74. National Labor Relations Act § 10(e), id. § 160(e).
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subsequent court proceedings. But, under the statutory scheme as it
presently exists, the Fekete decision does ensure that an agency
decision will not have the absolute effect of precluding any judicial
determination of the disputed matter.7s
75. Cf. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).

